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Abstract—Due to the broad attack surface and the lack of run-
time protection, potential safety and security threats hinder the
real-life adoption of autonomous vehicles. Although efforts have
been made to mitigate some specific attacks, there are few works
on the protection of the self-driving system. This paper presents
a decentralized self-protection framework called Guardauto to
protect the self-driving system against runtime threats. First,
Guardauto proposes an isolation model to decouple the self-
driving system and isolate its components with a set of partitions.
Second, Guardauto provides self-protection mechanisms for each
target component, which combines different methods to monitor
the target execution and plan adaption actions accordingly. Third,
Guardauto provides cooperation among local self-protection
mechanisms to identify the root-cause component in the case of
cascading failures affecting multiple components. A prototype has
been implemented and evaluated on the open-source autonomous
driving system Autoware. Results show that Guardauto could
effectively mitigate runtime failures and attacks, and protect the
control system with acceptable performance overhead.
Index Terms—Autonomous driving systems, Self-adaptive sys-
tems, Decentralized systems, Virtualization, Runtime protection
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the last decade, autonomous vehicles have been
attracting more and more attention. In particular, since Google
announced its self-driving project in 2010, many companies
and institutes have been devoting themselves into this domain,
such as Waymo, Tesla Autopilot, and Baidu Apollo Open
Platform 1.
Autonomous vehicles are complex cyber-physical systems.
As shown in Fig. 1, the hardware of such a system includes
sensors, electronic control units (ECUs) or actuators and other
embedded devices. The control software system, i.e., the
software running in a control computer, manages the operation
of different hardware devices, which is narrowly referred to
as the self-driving system or the autonomous driving systems
(ADS) in this paper. Specifically, the ADS collects data from
sensors to complete tasks such as path planning and navigation
control, and sends commands to ECUs via vehicle bus, e.g.,
Controller Area Network (CAN), to guide actuators. In that
sense, the ADS serves as the brain of a self-driving car.
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Fig. 1. A comprehensive autonomous vehicle system.
Due to the complexity nature, self-driving cars have a
broad attack surface [1], [2] that may allow adversaries to in-
trude remotely [3] (e.g., via Bluetooth, remote keyless entry, or
Uconnect), or to disrupt data links (e.g., conducting a camera,
Lidar or GPS spoofing [4], [5] to provide manipulated data).
Besides, the current self-driving system consists of dozens of
various functionalities, which may spawn hundreds of user
processes interacting with each other through tremendous
data exchange. As those functions are running together with
other applications on top of the same kernel, any software
failures or malware [6] could easily compromise the whole
system or interfere the self-driving control. Moreover, it is
also challenging to track the interaction among the driving
functionalities, which makes it difficult to analyze and model
the exact system behavior. Although several countermeasures
have been proposed as concluded in Sec. II, most of them
aim at the protection of specific devices or communications
against attacks, while few focuses on the protection of the
ADS. Potential attacks to such a system, e.g., disrupting
critical services or blocking the normal transmission, can
lead to catastrophes such as vehicles crashing and human
casualties. Thus, it is critical to keep potential intrusion or
software failures from disrupting the ADS to ensure its proper
execution [7].
Fault tolerance is important to protect such complicated
systems. Specifically, the protection mechanism is required to
identify the abnormal execution behavior, keep the ongoing
errors/failures from further jeopardizing other functionalities,
and restore the system back to normal. Except for the above
functional requirements, a protection system should also be
friendly to deployment and upgrade, which requires a flexible
design. Finally, the protection systems should also be resilient
to failures, which is seldom considered in existing works.
Therefore, challenges arise in developing such protection
scheme as the following.
1Waymo, https://waymo.com. Autopilot, https://www.tesla.com/autopilot.
Baidu Apollo, http://apollo.auto
2• How can the protection system identify an abnormal execu-
tion.
• How can it protect the rest system from a failed component.
• How an the system maintain the flexibility and scalability.
• How to ensure a reliable system design.
However, as traditional architecture-based solutions adopt the
central adaptation management [8], the adaptation layer may
suffer from single-point failure if any of its own functionalities
fail, and the mechanism lacks adequate scalability for further
upgrades, which will eventually make the system less effec-
tively to deal with new threats. Thus, they do not well address
all the challenges.
In this paper, we propose Guardauto, the guardian of
autonomous driving systems. First, Guardauto includes a
component model to decouple the ADS, and uses a hybrid
solution of virtual machine and container based partitions to
achieve isolation. Second, Guardauto deploys a decentralized
self-protection scheme for all components, which automati-
cally detects anomalies or failures in a isolated component
and adapts the ADS accordingly. Finally, instead of naively
mitigating all failed components, Guardauto analyzes the data
flow and leverages the global cooperation among local self-
protection mechanisms to locate where the root cause is,
and only restore that component, which ensures the system
availability. To illustrate the proposed approach, a prototype
of Guardauto is evaluated on an open-source control system
Autoware [9], which is based on Robot Operating System
(ROS) [10] and has been deployed in a variety of self-driving
platforms, e.g., ZMP RoboCar [11].
The main contribution of this work includes:
• By analyzing the autonomous driving system protection
challenges, we propose a component isolation model from
the functional perspective, which could be served as a
guideline to other similar systems.
• We present a decentralized self-protection system which
merges the need of system-level reconfiguration and a
resilient system design.
• We implement the self-protection system, and conduct eval-
uation to prove that such a system meets the design guideline
and can effectively mitigate runtime threats.
The reset of paper is organized as follows. Sec. II summaries
the related works on protecting self-driving cars, Sec. III
presents the preliminaries of this work, and Sec. IV describes
the detailed design of Guardauto, Sec. V gives the imple-
mentation. In Sec. VI, experiments are conducted to evaluate
Guardauto. We conclude this paper in Sec. VII.
II. RELATED WORK
1) Safety and Security of Autonomous Driving Vehicles.
Lee et al. [12] discussed how compile-time assurance, run-
time protection, automated testing and architectural security
could be used in automotive software. Seshia et al. [13]
discussed the major challenges in applying formal methods in
the specification, design and verification of semi-autonomous
vehicles. Adler et al. [14] proposed a safety engineering ap-
proach for self-driving vehicles through a safety superior and
fault tree based analysis to identify and handle malfunction.
Several protection solutions have also been proposed in the
architecture design. AUTOSAR [15] proposed an adaptive
platform, which leveraged SoA framework and distributed
computation, and also proposed identity, access, crypto and
key management to ensure security. Similar proposal can also
be found in [16].
Moreover, a variety of methods were proposed to counter
attacks. For example, Jasen et al. [17] proposed a multi-
receiver GPS spoofing and detection by checking the relative
distance of all receivers. However, such method required a
specific deployment of antennas covering at least 26m2, which
was not suitable for vehicular systems. Similar work could
also be found in [18], where infrastructure help (such as
road side mobile units) was used to detect the GPS jamming
attack, and research [19] leveraged pairwise inconsistencies
between sensors to detect transient attack or faults for GPS
receivers. Zhang et al. [20] proposed a behavior model based
approach to detect anomaly driving status. However, such a
model was built from in-vehicle sensor data offline without
the consideration of environmental factors (e.g. other running
vehicles and their influence on the driving behavior). Cho
and Shin [21] detected a specific DoS attack, where the error
handling mechanism of the CAN bus was exploited to force
the target ECUs enter the bus off status. However, it required
a strict timing synchronization to inject and launch the attack.
Authentication and encryption for in-vehicle communication
were also proposed [22], [23]. However, the overhead of
such mechanisms hindered the practical adoption. Recently,
Steger et al proposed a framework for secure and dependable
wireless software update on ECUs, [24], which adopted a
strong authentication and encryption to secure ECU firmware
update from data alteration or leak. However, other possible
threats, such as DoS attacks, were not considered.
The security and privacy concerns of vehicular networks
(e.g., V2X) also draw a lot of interest. Most existing works
focused on providing [25] 1) cryptography-based solutions,
such as authentication and encryption; 2) behavior-based
mechanisms for monitoring, such as rule-based monitoring
and weighted-sum method; 3) identity-based solutions, such
as using pseudonyms to preserve the privacy of vehicles’
locations. For example, Wu et al [26] proposed a resource
management scheme to secure vehicle-to-cloud communica-
tion from eavesdropping attacks, which focused on physical
layer security from the perspective of radio resource allocation.
Sedjelmaci et al [27] proposed a rule-based technique to model
the normal behavior of a vehicle with the help of roadside
units, which was used in the intrusion detection system against
false alerts and Sybil attacks.
All the above works aim at protecting the self-driving
system from specific attacks, especially on the cryptography
mechanism, sensor signal and communication of either internal
(e.g. CAN bus) or external networks (e.g. V2X). As far as we
know, there is few on the system protection.
2) Self-Protecting Systems.
Self-protecting systems are a class of self-adaptive systems
that detect and mitigate security threats at runtime [28]. C.-H.
Lung et al. [29] proposed an architectural self-healing frame-
work for concurrent environment, which instantly switched
3to an alternative when Half-Sync/Half-Async failures were
detected. Rodrı´guez et al. [30] proposed to protect systems
by adding security layers when attacks are discovered. The
selection of the added security layer was based on the eval-
uation of the protection mechanisms via dynamic Bayesian
networks. Frtunikj et al. [31] proposed an adaptive error and
state management model for autonomous cars, which aimed to
allow the system to automatically adapt after part of the system
failed. However, their model treated each error independently
without considering the possible failure propagation. Instead,
Guardauto deploys a cooperation mechanism to solve that. To
secure the web applications, Chen et al. [32] developed a self-
protecting system for the Internet of Things to autonomously
estimate, detect and react to cyber attacks by filtering ma-
licious packets or replacing compromised nodes. Watanabe
et al. [33] studied runtime monitoring through the signal
temporal logic to detect undesirable interactions between two
advanced driver-assistance system features. Unlike Guardauto,
those system adopted a central design which offered little
flexibility.
3) Software Isolation.
Partitions have been widely used in safety-critical systems
to separate different applications. Despite separation kernels,
hypervisor and containers are often used to separate execution
environment to protect sensitive programs or data. For exam-
ple, Liu et al. [34] proposed a virtualization-based SeCage to
protect critical secrets against exploiting memory disclosure
vulnerabilities. Xu et al. [35] proposed a container-based
solution, Condroid, for Android devices to mitigate security
risks. Xu et al. [36] discussed how privileged virtual machine
could be affected by hardware errors and how hypervisor
can cope with it. Xiao et al. [37] and Shan et al. [38] also
used virtualization technology to provide fault isolation by
encapsulating application instances. Thus, here we use unpriv-
ileged virtual machines and containers to isolate different ADS
components.
III. MOTIVATION
ROS [10] is an open-source and flexible framework for
developing robot control systems, which is prevailing in
robotics. Most self-driving systems are built with such a
framework, and the various libraries and packages (contributed
by both community users and the industry) built on top of
the Linux kernel. In such a way, the creation of complex
and robust robot behaviors across various robotic platforms is
simplified. However, as shown in Fig. 1, it also leads to a giant
system consisting of tremendous processes interacting with
each other to perform complex functions, including sensing,
data processing, localization, route planning, motion control,
trajectory control, etc., which makes it vulnerable to malware,
software failures, or even a kernel panic [1], [2], [39], [40].
For example, malware can be remotely distributed into self-
driving cars [6], [23] to disrupt system execution or intrude
the in-vehicle bus. Thus, it is urgent and necessary to decouple
and isolate each functionality.
In this work, we consider that an adversary may (1) intrude
the self-driving system through network connections, such as
the V2X communication or the software update over-the-air;
(2) implant malware to interfere the system execution, such
as consuming available resources, sending fabricated control
commands, or even disrupting critical services to cause system
failures, which are frequently used in remote attacks [3], [6].
Software vulnerabilities may also trigger abnormal execution
and lead to failures. In this work, we assume an ongoing threat
caused by either a software failure or attack can lead to anoma-
lies such as malfunctions or abnormal resource usage, which
can be handled by re-execution or backup-restore. We also
assume the underlying host OS infrastructure (including the
host OS kernel and the hypervisor) can be trusted. No physical
attack against ECUs, actuators and sensors is considered.
IV. DESIGN PRINCIPLES
To address the challenges presented in Sec. I, Guardauto is
designed to be a self-protection framework which can defend
the ADS with runtime monitoring and system adaptation.
In Guardauto, multiple independent guards protect their own
target ADS components and work cooperatively, which makes
Guardauto a essentially decentralized system. The design
premises include the following.
First, the effective detection of failures and attacks. The
protection system should effectively detect failures or attacks
in order to maintain the correct execution of the ADS. Thus,
the protection mechanism should be able to discover anoma-
lies from multiple dimensions, which requires that different
detection approaches shall be combined.
Second, the runtime protection of the ADS. As the ADS
consists of various software components, it is essential to
keep an ongoing threat (e.g. failure) from propagating and
compromising other functionalities/services by isolating the
software execution. Moreover, for all isolated components, as
there may be anomalies detected simultaneously, it is critical to
correctly locate and mitigate the root cause, instead of blindly
shutting down all suspects.
Third, the decentralized system design for better flexibility
and reliability. The flexibility and scalability require the pro-
tection system to be able to upgrade or migrated easily. For
example, as upgrading ADS will change the attack surface
by introducing implementation changes, which requires to
upgrade the corresponding protection without pausing other
defense functions. Besides, it is also important to keep the self-
protection systems from single point failures, which remains
a challenge in the current central system-level adaptation and
reconfiguration design. Thus, all above consideration requires
the protection scheme to be a decentralized system.
Finally, the overall design of Guardauto follows the princi-
ples below.
• Decoupling the ADS and isolating its components. Under
such a principle, the ADS will be divided into a set of com-
ponents, which will be further isolated by using partitions
(Section IV-A).
• Local self-protection through service degradation. Each
isolated component is guarded by an independent self-
protection loop, which monitors the component and per-
forms necessary operations to repair failures if any (Sec-
tion IV-B).
4Fig. 2. The Localization component abstraction of Autoware.
• Global self-protection through cooperation. In such a sys-
tem, cascading failures can still be triggered as false input
data may paralyze a component following the data flow,
which could make the local protection mistakenly executes
the protection action against the innocent component. Thus,
it is essential for the protection to locate the root cause
component, which requires a cooperation scheme among all
local protection mechanisms.
A. Component-based Decoupling and Isolation
In the autonomous driving system, the control performs
various functions, and each of them contains several parallel
and/or sequential processes. Here, a group of similar processes
can be intuitively defined as a component, which decouples the
ADS into a set of components. Thus, the component model
can be presented as a tuple (C,R), where C is a finite set of
components performing different functions, and R ⊂ C ×C is
the set of connections among components.
Definition 4.1: A port p is a tuple (M,α, µ), where M
is a finite set of methods in p; α ∈ {provided, required} is
the port type; and µ ∈ {synchronous, asynchronous} is the
communication type.
Definition 4.2: A component c is a tuple (Pp, Pr, G,W )
, where Pp is a finite set of provided ports; Pr is a finite
set of required ports; G is a finite set of sub-components;
and W ⊂ TP × IP is the non-reflexive port relation, where
IP = ∪sc∈G(sc.Pp ∪ sc.Pr) is the internal ports, and TP =
Pp ∪ Pr ∪ IP is the total ports.
We have applied both (4.1) and (4.2) to Autoware, and
derived the component abstraction for each functionality. For
example, Fig. 2 shows the Localization component, which
collects data from CAN bus (e.g., can info), map (e.g.,
points map) and sensor (e.g., nmea sentence) as required
ports, and outputs the vehicle position based on Lidar readings,
GPS coordinates and odometer feedbacksas provided ports
(e.g., current pose, predict pose).
ADS Components are determined by aggregating similar
atomic components. A component c is an atomic component
if c.G = ∅. A component provides a service to others via a
provided port, and requires a service from others via a required
port. Specifically, in a ROS-based system, a functionality may
contain several ROS nodes (functional processes). Thus, each
ROS node can been regarded as an atomic component. From
the above definition, a component is defined by two basic
principles. First, similar functional processes should be put in
Fig. 3. The complete component model of Autoware.
a component, if (1) their required ports are similar, such as dif-
ferent localization processes need same data (e.g., gnss pose
required by both ndt matching and ict matching nodes as
shown in Fig. 2) to produce results with different algorithms;
(2) their provided ports are similar, such as providing map data
in different forms. Second, the cardinality of R and C should
be balanced. A fine-grained partition of the functionality set
could lead to large C andR. Given the computing capability of
the control computer and the complexity of system integration,
they should be reduced. Because the larger C and R are, the
more resources will be consumed to protect all components.
Thus, there are 8 components: Data Loading, Localization,
Sensing, Data Fusion, Path Planning, Object Tracking, Motion
Planning, and Path Following, which is also derived from a
general ADS architecture [41].
Definition 4.3: The component model of the ADS is a
tuple (C,R), where C is a finite set of components performing
different functions, and R ⊂ C × C is the set of connections
among components.
The component model of Autoware is shown in Fig. 3,
where each node denotes a component and arrows compose
the set of connections. The component set is C = {Data
Loading, Localization, Sensing, Path planning, Fusion, Object
Tracking, Motion Planning, Path Following}. Connection rela-
tions describe the data flow among components. For example,
Localization component requires data from Data Loading and
Sensing components, so (Data Loading, Localization) ∈ R
and (Sensing, Localization) ∈ R.
Given the component model of an ADS (C,R), suppose C =
{c1, c2, . . . , cn}, Rd is the d-dimensional Euclidean space, and
N is the set of all non-negative integers. Definition 4.4 defines
the general formula of the isolation set of an ADS.
Definition 4.4: The isolation model of an ADS (C,R) is a
tuple (C, I), where C is the set of components and each of
them is put in a partition; and I is a vector-valued function
(r, t, s, b) satisfying:
• r : C → Rd specifies the allocation of d kinds of
resources to the component partitions;
• t : C → [0, 1] denotes the isolation level of components,
the higher level of the isolation, the smaller value;
• s : C → N assigns a mitigation solution to each component,
where each number represents a unique policy;
• b : C → N assigns the maximum allowed number of
mitigation operations.
Specifically, r(c) indicates the maximal resources which can
be allocated to c (CPU, memory, etc.). Due to the limited
resources, the sum of resource allocated to partitions should
5not exceed the host available resources. t(c) represents how c
should be isolated and protected. For simplicity, here t(c) is set
to be either 0 or 1. t(c) = 0 means that c is more vulnerable
than others, such as it has a larger attack surface or could
cause severer failures like a kernel panic, otherwise t(c) = 1.
s(c) indicates the mitigation policies for c. Currently, only
backup and reset operations are considered, so s(c) is set to 0
or 1. If s(c) = 1, then the failure of c will be handled by its
backups. Otherwise, the failure will be mitigated by resetting
the partition. b(c) is the allowed number of s(c) operations,
which could be the number of backups or allowed resetting
operations. Considering the trade-off between allowed mitiga-
tion operations and system performance, for simplicity, only
1 backup or 1 resetting is allowed for each component,
B. Self-Protection Mechanism
After the system decoupling, Guardauto deploys a local self-
protection system for each isolated ADS component. Each
local protection system operates on its own while cooperating
with others to determine the correct adaptation.
1) Local Protection mechanism.
Each local protection function, e.g. monitor and planner,
is independent and interacts with each other through network
communication. Such design enables a flexible scheme, allows
more functions to be integrated freely in the future, especially
new monitoring metrics and corresponding analyzers. The lo-
cal protection keeps inspecting the runtime status and behavior
of the target, then those gathered metrics are analyzed for
any anomaly. The planner will generate adaptation plan to
mitigate the abnormal component according to its adaptation
configuration. Finally, the executor will carry out the planned
action to put the target back to normal. The whole process is
shown in Fig. 4.
Currently, the local protection inspects the target component
execution with three different approaches, i.e. the resource
profiling, process validation and runtime behavior modeling.
Resource exhaustion attacks or potential software bugs may
drain computation resources like CPU and memory, which
slows down the system and makes service unavailable. The
monitor gathers the resource usage data and sends it to
the analyzer periodically. As it is challenging to set up a
usage baseline, the usage inspection is done by examining
the current data against the history records from the analyzer
side. A threshold is preset by the system integrator to help the
inspection. Any violation against the threshold will trigger an
alert from the analyzer.
The process validation is designed to identify any rogue
process that may harm the system. The assumption is that
the programs running in a component remain the same while
various driving data is being processed. Thus, any newly
spawned process could be a potential malware. As the self-
driving system is decoupled within several partitions, the
system integrator could identify and determine the allowed
user programs and services during test and integration. Thus,
a whitelist could be set for process validation. The monitor
will periodically check for the running process inside the
target component partition to gather the process id (PID),
name and CR3 control register value. As PID, CR3 and
Fig. 4. Local protection process.
name should remain unchanged during each execution, the
analyzer will validate those values with previous checking
result periodically.
To inspect the component execution and identify abnormal
behaviors, especially those conducted by hidden processes, a
system call (syscall) based modeling technique is adopted.
Syscalls are the prime programmatic way to request privileged
services or operations for a user program in Linux systems.
Thus, syscalls tracing is widely used to identify abnormal exe-
cution caused by malware, rootkits or software vulnerabilities,
etc., especially in host based intrusion detection. The syscall
traces gathered in clean and safe tests could be used to set up
the baseline for anomaly detection. The monitor intercepts all
syscall invocations issued by the target component partition in
each monitoring window, and extracts required feature data for
further check. The analyzer uses the trained detection model to
examine whether the collected invocation data complies with
the baseline or not.
The planner is responsible for generating a mitigation
solution. After the analyzer confirms a rogue partition, the
corresponding planner will be notified for further adaptation. It
should first check the component configuration for adaptation
options, such as choosing the successor of a failed partition (if
multiple backups are available), and then generate a sequence
of pseudo actions. To restore a component back to normal,
two main actions are included. One is ‘reset’ or ‘cold restart’,
which is shutting down (destroying) the component and start
it again. The other is restart (or ’warm restart’), which is to
re-launch the component or its backup. The planned action
will be sent to the executor in pseudo code. Then the executor
will carry out all planned actions by translating those pseudo
actions into API invocations to complete the adaptation with
the help of the partition manager (e.g. hypervisor or container
manager). After that, a typical local self-protection loop is
completed.
2) Global Cooperation mechanism.
Even though the control system is decoupled into a set
of partitions, there are still data flows among them. Thus,
the improper behaviors of a failed component may lead to
the failure of others, such as producing incorrect results.
This motivates Guardauto to provide a cooperation mechanism
among partitions to identify and perform the adaptation for
only the root-cause partition, rather than blindly mitigating all
failed ones. Hereafter, a local protection mechanism and its
guarded partition are denoted as a unit.
6Definition 4.5: A data-flow graph (DFG) of ADS (C,R) is
a tuple G = (N,F ), where
• N is a set of nodes. ∀n ∈ N , n = (c, id, Up, Down)
represents a unit, where c ∈ C is the component in the
unit, id is a unique index integer of the unit, Up is the set
of its upstream units, and Down is the set of downstream
units;
• F ⊂ N × N denotes the data flow among units.
∀ n1, n2 ∈ N , (n1, n2) ∈ F if (n1.c, n2.c) ∈ R.
The data flow from unit A to unit B is denoted as A →
B, where B is called a downstream unit of A and A is an
upstream unit of B. All downstream units and upstream units
of A form the Up set and Down set defined in Definition 4.5
respectively.
Example 4.1: Fig. 3 shows the control system Autoware
with eight units, where the number denotes the unit id. Unit
Fusion requires the data from units Localization and Sensing,
and sends its result to unit Object Tracking. Thus, it can be
denoted as (Fusion, 5, {2, 3}, {6}).
Upon cooperation, each unit maintains its local knowledge
about a detected failure: the set of failed upstream units’ ids,
and the “sick status” indicating whether the unit is analyzed
as “failed” or not. Such information is exchanged periodically
during a cooperative failure handling.
Once the upstream units’ failure knowledge is retrieved, a
unit determines how it acts, as shown in Fig. 5(a). Generally,
a unit has three states when dealing with possible failures:
1) normal, when the unit determines that there is no failure;
2) pending, meaning that the unit is waiting for failure
assertions from its upstream units; and 3) failed, meaning that
the unit is really suffering from a local failure which has to
be mitigated. Transitions among the states are described in
Fig. 5(a). A unit stays at the normal state if no failures are
detected (i.e., transition (1)). Once it detects a failure, the
unit switches to the pending state (i.e., transition (2)) and
stays at the pending state if its failure queue (the set of
failed upstream units) is not empty (i.e., transition (3)); if
sick bit (sick status) is 0 (i.e., the former failure is caused by
another component), the unit switches back to the normal state
(i.e., transition (4)); otherwise, if the failure queue is empty,
meaning the unit is actually failed, the unit switches to the
failed state (i.e., transition (5)). After executing the planned
adaptation actions, the unit switches to the normal state if
the failure no longer exists (i.e., transition (7)). Otherwise, it
switches back to the pending state (i.e., transition (6)).
For example, given a DFG in which A → B ← C ← D,
assume that 1) A and D have no upstream units, B has no
downstream units; and 2) D, C and B suffer from failures
while A is healthy. Then the cooperation between 4 units will
be conducted as shown in Fig. 5(b). When D detects a local
failure, it will switch to ‘pending’ state, and reports to its
downstream unit C for the failure status. C will add D into its
failure queue and tells its downstream unit B. As B is also in
‘pending’ state and is only aware of C’s status, it will request
the rest of its upstream units, i.e. unit A, for failure status.
After A reports no failure detected, B will update its failure
queue→ {D,C}. When D is handling its failure, it will keep
report its failure status until the adaptation is done. Once it is
(a) State transition of a unit during global cooperation.
(b) A cooperation example.
Fig. 5. Global cooperation between units.
back to ‘normal’ state, D will send a failure clear message to
notify its downstream units. Upon C receives that notification,
it will remove D from its failure queue and keeps broadcasting
its own updated failure status. After B receives those messages,
it will update the failure queue from {D,C} → {C}. As all
C’s upstream units (unit D) are normal, C will begin local
failure handling and return to ‘normal’. After that, C will send
notification to its downstream unit B so that B is aware that
all units in the failure queue are back to normal now. Finally,
B will carry out adaptation to deal with the local failure, then
it switches back to “normal” state.
V. GUARDAUTO SYSTEM
We have implemented the Guardauto prototype on Auto-
ware. In this section, we will present details on how the system
isolation and the self-protection system are achieved.
A. System Isolation
As shown in Fig. 6, Guardauto currently uses a hybrid
solution to achieve isolation. The hardware-assisted virtual-
ization provided by hypervisors like Xen offers better sep-
aration, while containerization like LXD provide better per-
formance [42], [43]. As the safety and security threats may
arise from both inside and outside the self-driving function-
s/software, TrustZone-like solutions are not adopted. As such
solutions offer only one trusted execution environment (secure
world), which cannot meet the requirement of separating the
self-driving functions from other applications/services and the
ADS components from each other. However, a fully verified
isolation kernel or microvisor may be leveraged. But due to
the availability and implementation issues, currently we do not
find such a capable open system.
Components will be encapsulated based on their properties
introduced in Section IV-A. If t(c) = 1, then the component
7Fig. 6. Architecture of Guardauto.
will be isolated in an unprivileged LXD container, otherwise
in an unprivileged hardware virtual machine (HVM). Given
the isolation model introduced in Section IV-A, the properties
of each component in Guardauto can be determined as shown
in Table I. Those accessing devices are put in separated virtual
machines because they are more exposed to potential attacks.
Once those components are compromised or failed, the possi-
ble crash in either guest kernel or the software will not easily
spread and affect others. Other components are running in
unprivileged containers together with necessary ROS libraries
and third party applications. Components including Fusion,
Object Tracking, Path Planning and Motion Planning do not
require interaction with external devices as they only rely on
other components to feed them input data. Thus, they are
relatively less vulnerable to attacks, and their failures are less
likely to cause severe impacts (e.g., kernel panic). Finally,
wireless connections (e.g., wireless interfaces) can also be
encapsulated in another dedicated partition with the help of
device pass-through, in order to reduce the possible attack
surface.
B. Local Self-Protection for Each Partition
Guardauto is mainly implemented in C++/Python, where a
variety of libraries and technology are adopted.
1) Monitoring and Analysis.
Monitors inspect target components’ behaviors by collecting
the resource usage, the running processes and the execution
behavior, as shown in Fig. 7 (“Monitor” and “Analyze”). Those
data are gathered in a clean and safe state to set up the
baseline for analysis. An embedded agent distributed with the
base partition image gathers resource usage and transfers it
to the monitor. Compared with external monitoring, the agent
can collect a variety of date accurately and conveniently by
using psutil. CPU and memory utilization is examined by
preset individual threshold, and is dynamically compared with
historical statistics. The data transmission also serves as heart
beats to indicate whether the monitored target is running or
not.
The running processes gathered are used for process val-
idation. To identically label a running process, the PID, the
process name and the CR3 register value are retrieved. With
the help of LIBVMI and pre-dumped kernel symbol list,
the first step is to locate the memory address of init task,
which could be used to locate the task list as Linux stores
all processes in such a circular doubly linked list. To further
retrieve the required information such as PID, according to
the offset of PID in task struct structure (defined in Linux
source code include/linux/sched.h), the address of PID could
be located and its value can be retrieved as an int. Following
Fig. 7. Procedure of component self-protection.
the same idea, the name is to locate the comm array and get
the content. By walking the task list, each process could be
examined. The CR3 is retrieved with syscall invocation and
will be explained later. The process name is checked with the
white list as both should be unchanged during any execution.
The PID and CR3 values are recorded when a component is
brought up, and both should remain the same in every check
during the current execution.
The syscall invocation is traced by leveraging breakpoint-
based interception [44]. Such technique traps syscall entry
addresses (located by address translation with the given system
symbol map) by injecting INT3 instruction, so that any invoca-
tion in kernel space could be traced, which is efficient against
rootkits. When such a trap is triggered, an event callback will
filter all registers to get CR3, record the current process and
the invoked syscall. Given that there are multiple processes in
the target component partition, those data gathered in clean
and safe state are used to establish the white list of allowed
syscalls, and the frequency feature of invocation pattern is
extracted and trained with one-class support vector machine.
During the runtime checking, the analyzer will alert any
anomaly invocation against the pre-trained SVM model.
CAN bus is used in self-driving cars to provide com-
munication between the control PC and ECUs. Guardauto
uses libpcap and SocketCAN to capture CAN frames, then
calculates the frequency and build frame event sequence in
each sliding window. As frames of smaller ids have higher
priority in the bus arbitration, if such frames are transmitted
in a high frequency, other transmission is likely to be cut off.
Thus, the frames ids and counts are used to identify any illegal
activity. As the normal CAN frame transmission is highly
regular [2], [21], any sudden frequency or count increase could
cause a potential DoS attack. To double check the system
behavior, the captured frames are also cross validated with
the control commands issued by Autoware to identify any
stealthily injected frames.
The analyzer also supports user defined policies, which
will be parsed by a flex/yacc-based implementation. The
preprocessor receives monitoring data and parses them into
proper data structures, then feeds the processed results into the
analysis module. The analysis module will automatically parse
the predefined policy into several individual rules to examine
the input data, and score each checking as 0 (not matching)
or 1 (matching). For example, inspired by [45], to check CAN
bus activities in Path Following, Guardauto gathers the event
sequence in a sliding time window h. An event e = {id, t(id)},
8where id represents CAN frame id and t(id) is the recorded
time stamp. Thus, an event sequence can be defined as ρ =
[e1, e2, ..., en, . . .]. Then rules can be defined for this sequence,
such as: p1: (Cx : 〈t(id1), t(id1)+h〉.Cx < θ1) and p2: (Cx :
〈t(id1), t(id1)+h〉.Cy : 〈t(id2), t(id2)+h).(Cx−Cy) < θ2).
where Cx is the number of id1 in the time window h starting
from t(id1), and Cy is the count of id2. p1 checks single frame
count, while p2 checks any related two sequences. Multiple
rules could be integrated like p1&& p2 &&...&& pm, which
is used to perform complex checking. After that, scores are
used to determine if there is something suspicious. A score
voter compares the results from a successive number of sliding
windows to see if the majority fail or not.
2) Plan and Execution.
Once the planner receives a failure report from the analyzer,
it will check the corresponding adaptation configuration to
plan possible mitigation as shown in Fig. 7. According to each
component’s properties, planners take different actions.
• For a component with no backups (b(c) = 0), planners will
reset it.
• For those whose b(c) = 1, planners will replace them with
their backups.
• Otherwise, planners call for a system reboot to put every-
thing back to normal.
Guardauto uses XML-based configuration files to store
a component’s adaptation settings. Each configuration file
contains a “node” (the main component) and its “sub-nodes”
(backups). Each node is sorted by its id, and each main
component’s id is 0. If multiple backups are allowed, then
the sub-node with id = n+ 1 will be the successor, where n
is the id of the current running one. Upon a restoring decision
is made, planners will generate the pseudo action sequence
for the executor, e.g. planners will first boot a backup, then
launch necessary services, and finally shut down the original
partition. Each plan message includes the following fields.
• header, containing sequence id, time stamp, and type called
‘plan’ which indicates it is a plan message;
• opcode, indicating the operation type, such as start, stop,
launch or pause;
• successor name, telling the backup partition’s name, which
is retrieved from the configuration file;
• launch file path, telling how to launch the backup service
if needed, retrieved from the configuration file;
• payload, other arguments like the IP address and partition
type, retrieved from the configuration file.
Those plan actions will be sent serially, and executors
could just “translate” those sequences into commands or API
invocations, then carry them out. For partition operations
including start, stop, reboot and pause, the corresponding
hypervisor or container manager APIs such as libxenlight or
pylxd will be invoked. If a planner sends launch messages to
start a service in a partition, then roslaunch python APIs are
to be used, the executor refers to the partition name (as host
name) to specify where the service process should be spawned
by invoking roslaunch.
C. Global Self-Protection via Unit Cooperation
Unlike a centralized adaptation control which requires a
global decision maker, each unit in Guardauto acts indepen-
Algorithm V.1 Cooperation procedure of unit u.
Require:
failure queue ← ∅ ⊲ (local) the sequence of failure units.
sick bit ← 0 ⊲ the node status, 0: normal and 1: failure.
Ensure:
failure queue == ∅
sick bit == 0
1: loop
2: analyze monitoring data
3: if failure detected then ⊲ switch to pending state
4: if sick bit == 0 then
5: sick bit ← 1
6: ask upstream nodes for failure assertion ⊲ in case of beacon delay
7: update failure queue by subscribing upstream units’ failure beacons
8: if failure queue 6= ∅ then
9: publish failure beacon to its downstream units
10: else ⊲ switch to failure state
11: perform local self-protection
12: else ⊲ switch to normal state
13: if sick bit == 1 then
14: sick bit← 0
15: failure queue ← ∅
16: publish a clear beacon to its downstream units
17: end loop
dently. A unit cooperates with others by collecting analysis
reports from the upstream and sending its local assertion to
its downstream units. The data structure of each unit includes:
1) a string indicating its name, 2) a unique integer as its id,
3) queues containing its upstream units’ ids and downstream
units’ ids respectively. Hence, messages traversing among
units contain the following fields:
• header, containing message sequence number, time stamp,
and type called ‘unit’ indicating it is for cooperation;
• source id, the id of the sender unit;
• sick bit, a boolean value denoting the status of the sender
unit;
• failure queue, an array of failed units’ ids.
Each unit publishes its failure beaconid in the above
format upon any failures detected, and cooperates according
to Algorithms V.1. When a failure is detected, the unit enters
pending state. It updates its sick bit and actively inquires
that upstream units (Lines 4 − 6) (if an upstream unit’s
beacon is delayed or the upstream unit functions well). Then
it updates its failure queue according to acquired failure
beacons (Line 7). If an upstream unit works normally, its id
should be removed, otherwise its id should be inserted into
failure queue. If failure queue is not empty, the unit stays
at the pending state and keeps sending its failure beacon
(Lines 8 and 9). Otherwise, if the failure still exists, the unit
confirms it and switches to the failure state, then executes the
local mitigation (Line 11). Once the failure status has been
cleared, the unit goes to the normal state, it also updates the
sick bit and failure queue to inform the downstream units
(Lines 12 − 16).
VI. EVALUATIONS
In the following test, real driving data 1 recorded by Tier IV,
Inc. (the maintainer of Autoware) was used as system inputs,
which was recorded during road tests in Moriyama, Japan.
Those data include 3D maps, LIDAR/CAMERA/GPS signals,
which were fed into Data Loading, Sensing and Localization
components.
1https://www.autoware.ai/
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EXAMPLES OF COMPONENT PROPERTIES
Partition t(c) s(c) r(c)
Sensing 0 0 2 cores, 2GB Memory
Data Loading 0 1 2 cores, 2GB Memory
Localization 0 1 2 cores, 2GB Memory
Fusion 1 1 4 cores (shared), 2GB Memory
Object Tracking 1 0 4 cores (shared), 2GB Memory
Path Planning 1 1 4 cores (shared), 2GB Memory
Motion Planning 1 1 4 cores (shared), 2GB Memory
Path Following 0 0 2 cores, 2GB Memory
ROS core node 1 - 4 cores (shared), 2GB Memory
Following our design and implementation, we isolated and
deployed Autoware (version 1.5.1) in 9 partitions by using
Xen 4.10 and LXD 2.21 as discussed in Section V-A. Partition
properties are shown in Table I. Guardauto ran in Xen Domain-
0 as it was assumed to be trusted. Our evaluation platform
was a Dell workstation with an Intel Xeon E5-1650 v3 CPU
(12 logic cores), 32 GB memory and 1 TB hard drive. The
host operating system was Ubuntu 16.04.3 amd64, with Linux
kernel version 4.4.108.
A. Evaluation on Local Self-Protection
We set up two test scenarios to evaluate how Guardauto
could effectively defend the ADS with local self-protection
mechanisms. In the first scenario, an adversary breached and
launched an attack in the Localization partition to degrade
the performance by exhausting the available memory, which
delayed the calculation and transmission of corresponding po-
sitioning message /gnss pose. In the second test, a software
failure was injected to crash the Fusion component, which
cut down the computation and transmission of fused point
images /points image. Each test lasted for 200 seconds,
where either the attack or failure was injected at the 80th
second. In both cases, Guardauto was supposed to detect the
abnormal situation and planned a system reconfiguration by
starting the backup partition and stopping the compromised
service.
Fig. 8 showed the test result, where the x-axis denoted the
sequence of messages in time order, and the y-axis denoted
the sending time stamp. In Fig. 8(a), as the Noraml curve
showed, position messages were transmitted at about every
75ms averagely (the gradient of line). After the attack occurred
at the 80th second, without Guardauto, the message transmis-
sion was delayed as the solid curve (Failure) showed. Instead,
Guardauto mitigated the abnormal and restored the normal
transmission, as the dash curve (Self-Adaptive) was parallel
to the dot line (Normal) after the adaptation. In Fig. 8(b),
as the component crashed after 80 seconds (the black line
ended at the 80th second), Guardauto detected the failure and
brought up a backup. As Data Fusion processed large amount
of image data, the service restoration took longer (as the dash
line showed).
As recorded in the test, the cold partition restoration aver-
agely took about 4.64s, recorded from the execution operation
began to the first message was received from the backup,
including the creation of a partition, the bootstrapping of
the operating system and services, and the initialization and
computation of the new processes in backup which varied
according to their workloads. It further motivated us to inves-
tigate the time overhead and possible future improvements.
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Fig. 8. Local protection against failures.
To investigate the time overhead, we analyzed the booting
of a cold backup in Guardauto. First, we analyzed the time
of starting a partition. It took 466.82ms to boot a container
partition from invoking the executor’s start partition function
to the first partition status check returning “Running” in 100
tests.
Second, we evaluated the time required to start a new
ROS node after the partition was ready. The result showed
the nmea2tfpose node of Localization component was
launched and initialized in 639.19ms averagely, which sug-
gested that using a hot backup could much further reduce the
restoration.
It also indicated that 3534ms (i.e., 4640− 466.82− 639.19)
was spent in handling other operations. Except for booting
other OS services (e.g., networking and ssh), computing the
workload and publishing the first message (by the node),
we found the most of time was spent on handling the race
condition of concurrent container operations (by the lxd man-
ager). As the executor of Guardauto replaced a component by
requesting to start the backup first and then to stop the failed
partition, lxd manager handled both operations and triggered
a race condition on accessing container storage pool and
invoking system calls in a short period. It can be optimized by
slightly delaying the stop partition request, so the lxd manager
could handle operations serially, which greatly reduced the
time gap from thousands to hundreds of milliseconds as
observed in the evaluation. Meanwhile, the old services will
be deactivated replaced by the new ones, so we did not have
to worry about data conflicts.
B. Evaluation on Global Cooperation
The global cooperation is the key to the decentralized
self-protection mechanism in Guardauto. Thus, we simulated
multiple failures to evaluate the cooperation mechanism in
this test. To achieve that, we set up five scenarios where
failures were simultaneously occurred in multiple units, i.e.,
{5}, {4, 5}, {5, 6}, {4, 5, 6} and {4, 5, 6, 7}, due to depen-
dency shown in Fig. 9(a), units {5, 6, 7}, {4, 5, 6, 7}, {5, 6, 7},
{4, 5, 6, 7} and {4, 5, 6, 7} were affected respectively. Based
on results and analysis in Sec. VI-A, we assumed 650ms was
required for the hot backup-restore. In each simulation sce-
nario, the cooperation beacon message was transmitted every
100ms. The sending time stamps of all beacon messages were
recorded and used to analyze the cooperation performance.
The result showed that the root-cause partitions were cor-
rectly identified and handled in all tests. Besides, Fig. 9(b)–
9(f) showed the time overhead of state transitions, where the
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Fig. 9. Global cooperation against multiple failures.
x-axis denoted the sequence of sent beacon messages, and
the y-axis denoted their sending time stamps. Specifically, in
Fig. 9(b), after unit 5 detected its failure, it spent 879.56ms
(ts(5.2) − ts(5.1), where ts(i.j) indicated the sending time
stamp of j-th message from unit i) to complete the local
adaptation or send the clear beacon message (i.e., setting 0
to sick bit).
Once unit 6 received unit 5’s clear beacon, it spent
299.92ms (ts(6.11)−max(ts(5.2), ts(6.10))) to prepare and
send its own clear beacon. Similarly, unit 7 spent 299.96ms
(ts(7.13)−max(ts(7.12), ts(6.11), ts(4.1))) to complete the
above procedure. Note that unit 4 also sent a beacon message
to unit 7 on unit 7’s demand.
Similarly, in Fig. 9(c), units 4 and 5 took 879.55ms and
879.57ms to adapt to the failures respectively. After that, it
took 299.96ms for unit 6 and 300.02ms for unit 7 to clear
their failure status. Note that the curves of units 4 and 5 were
overlapped as failures simultaneously occurred in both units.
From the above results, it averagely cost 893.0ms for a
failed unit to collect beacon messages, complete local restora-
tion and send the clear beacon, while an affected unit took
296.1ms to receive beacon messages and clear its failure status.
Such time overhead could also be reduced by optimizing the
beacon transmission speed. Such time analysis also fit the rest
test cases, which indicated that the cooperation mechanism
worked stably. For example, when handling failures caused
by one single component, e.g., in Fig. 9(b), it took 1479.6ms
for all affected units to complete local self-protection actions,
i.e., 893.0 (unit 5) + 296.1 (unit 6) + 296.1 (unit 7) ≈ 1479.6.
Then, the time increased to 2020.0ms (≈ 893.0 (units 4 and 5)
+ 893.0 (unit 6) + 296.1 (unit 7)) to handle failures caused by
{4, 5, 6} and 2699.3ms (≈ 893.0 (units 4 and 5) + 893.0 (unit
6) + 893.0 (unit 7)) for {4, 5, 6, 7} (in the above analysis, unit
4 and 5 had no dependency).
C. Evaluation on Performance Overhead
Most programs in Autoware operate as 1) listening for
incoming data, 2) executing programmed computation logic
with those data to output results, 3) sending the result to other
interested program. Thus, Autoware relies heavily on the net-
work communication. Further evaluation on the performance
overhead imposed on the message transmission latency was
conducted. In this test, the latency data was gathered and
analyzed, as it could tell how the program’s execution and
communication would be delayed, which implied how much
overhead could be introduced to the overall system.
First, we ran Autoware in a bare-metal platform and
analyzed message latency without Guardauto to establish the
baseline, and then we enabled Guardauto and reran the exper-
iment. Each test lasted for 100 seconds and was conducted
for 3 times. The message transmission latency was calculated
based on the recorded sending and receiving time stamps. We
focused on three messages with different workloads: local-
ization message (in Localization, 136B/each), object image
message (in Object Tracking, 1050B/each), and point image
message (in Fusion, 7MB/each).
The distribution of transmission latency was shown in Fig.
10, where the x-axis denoted the message ids and the y-
axis denoted their latency. Compared with baseline results,
the localization message transmission showed noticeable jitters
after deploying Guardauto. Because isolation increased the
network complexity, the transmission in Guardauto jumped
more hops from from one partition to another. Moreover, as
both image messages contained more bytes, the transmission
cost more time than that of the localization messages, as shown
in Figs. 10(b) and 10(c); and the communication jitters also
introduced due to the TCP congestion control and possible
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Fig. 10. Communication latency imposed by Guardauto.
re-transmission. On average, the localization message delay
was increased by 0.23ms (from 0.38ms to 0.61ms), while for
object and points image messages, the average difference was
within 5%.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we propose a decentralized self-protection
framework called Guardauto to protect self-driving systems
from runtime failures or attacks. Such a protection system
decouples the autonomous driving system into components and
adopts virtualization-based techniques to isolate them. Then,
Guardauto defends all autonomous driving system components
with both local and cooperated self-protection mechanisms.
Evaluation results show that the implemented prototype meets
the design goals, which can effectively detect and mitigate
runtime threats. The flexible design enables Guardauto great
potential in securing self-driving systems. However, the cru-
sade of building such a system has just started, and Guardauto
requires more efforts in especially providing more practical
and innovative techniques for the failure/attack mitigation.
For the next step, we plan to further evaluate Guardauto
and optimize its performance. Second, analysis of internal
interactions shall be conducted to develop a proper runtime
verification approach, which can be used to reason whether the
possible adaptation plan can satisfy the system requirements
(e.g., reliability). Moreover, we will extend Guardauto with
more fine-grained inspection approaches. We also plan to bring
the self-protection idea to secure hardware devices like ECUs.
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